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Abstract— Access to Electronic Patient Record (EPR) data is 
audited heavily within healthcare infrastructures. However, it 
is often left untouched in a data silo and only accessed on an ad 
hoc basis. Users with access to the EPR infrastructure are able 
to access the data of almost any patient without reprimand.  
Very Important Patients (VIPs) are an exception, for which the 
audit logs are regularly monitored. Otherwise, only if an 
official complaint is logged by a patient are audit logs 
reviewed. Data behaviour within healthcare infrastructures 
needs proactive monitoring for malicious, erratic or unusual 
activity. In addition, external threats, such as phishing or 
social engineering techniques to acquire a clinician’s logon 
credentials, need to be identified. This paper presents research 
towards a system which uses data analysis and visualisation 
techniques deployed in a cloud setting. The system adds to the 
defence-in-depth of the healthcare infrastructures by 
understanding patterns of data for profiling users’ behaviour 
to enable the detection and visualisation of anomalous 
activities. The results demonstrate the potential of visualising 
accesses to patient records for the situational awareness of 
patient privacy officers within healthcare infrastructures.  
Keywords-Electronic Patient Records; Patient Privacy; 
Information Security; Data Analysis; Visualisation; Healthcare 
Infrastructures; Cloud Computing. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The health sector consistently constitutes the highest 
number of reported data security incidents according to the 
UK Information Commissioners Office [1]. The healthcare 
sector is an appealing target to attackers due to the high 
value of patient data on the black market. Patient data is 
valuable due to the wealth of detailed personal information 
held within, and the potential to commit identity fraud as a 
result. 
Confidentiality and patient privacy within Electronic 
Patient Records (EPR) systems is typically managed through 
an agreed and signed code of practice between the 
organisation and its users. A healthcare organisation that 
collects, analyses, publishes or disseminates confidential 
patient data must commit to ensuring that the data is only 
accessed by relevant personnel and only when it is 
appropriate to do so [2]. However, in many cases, measures 
are not taken to detect and prevent patient privacy violations; 
any breaches of confidentiality are only brought to light once 
an investigation is launched, which is often too late. EPR 
systems are audited; however, the quantity of EPR audit data 
is significant and a challenge for regular analysis by an 
Information Security Analyst. Only a big data capable 
solution using a cloud platform is able to proactively monitor 
data for patient privacy violations. 
Due to the increased need for 24-hour data access the 
boundaries for healthcare systems is evolving; General 
Practitioners (GPs) are progressively using Virtual Private 
Networks (VPN) and 3G connections to remotely access 
patient data. As a result, the number of access points for 
hackers is increasing [3] and healthcare organisations should 
have processes in place to identify data loss and wipe data 
remotely. Additionally, with many patients having the option 
of accessing their healthcare data from home PCs and mobile 
devices, the attack surface is increasing still further. 
To detect abnormal data behaviours, visualisation 
techniques provide both awareness and modelling 
capabilities for the benefit of computing in critical 
infrastructures. This allows an analyst to understand data 
correlations and identify anomalies for investigation through 
the shape or colour of data patterns [4]. 
It is unfeasible to set rules for every single user and 
patient with an EPR as 1) Information Security teams are 
typically under resourced and 2) even if the resource is 
available to do this, it often would not provide meaningful 
information. Rules-based solutions cannot detect violations 
(such as Advanced Persistent Threats) in these contexts [3].  
This paper proposes a cloud-based anomaly detection 
system which integrates data analysis and visualisation 
techniques. The system visualises relationships between 
users and patients in a novel and interactive way. Data 
analysis algorithms have the capability to explore complex 
datasets, detect hidden patterns and anomalies within them, 
and learn from analyst feedback. Visualisation techniques 
can be used to represent dense information visually, to 
augment the interpretation process. Cloud technology 
facilitates the extensive processing power and scalability a 
system would require to process the EPR audit data in real-
time. The results demonstrate the potential for data analysis 
and visualisation techniques to aid the situational awareness 
of patient privacy officers within healthcare infrastructures. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II 
presents a literature review of the background research on 
patient privacy within EPR systems. Section III outlines our 
system design. Section IV presents our results and a sample 
of test data. Section V discusses conclusions and the future 
work to be done.   
II. BACKGROUND 
Patient privacy within EPR systems is typically enforced 
through corrective mechanisms, such as two factor 
authentication, training and confidentiality agreements 
[5][6]. Approaches for detecting illegitimate access to EPRs  
[7] include restricting access control [8], applying patient-
user matching algorithms [9], applying scenario-based rule 
extraction [10], and information gathering from EPR and 
non-EPR systems using a secure protocol [11]. This is in 
addition to commonly-used security mechanisms, such as 
secure networks with firewalls, encrypted devices and 
messages, strong user passwords, auditing and device 
timeouts [6].  
When there is reason to suspect that unauthorised 
accesses have occurred, a review of the audit logs is 
undertaken by a security expert. However, this is inefficient 
because the overall process requires the information to be 
collated and reviewed by a security expert. It is also purely 
retrospective, and the process is only triggered when an 
anomaly is detected [7]. Therefore, there is a motivation to 
automate and alleviate the burden of this process [5]. 
The fundamental limitations in manual audit log 
reviewing are threefold [7]. 1) The volume of audit records 
means that audit logs are only practically useful as a 
supplementary information source to investigate suspected 
breaches, rather than a tool that can be utilised to proactively 
find illegitimate accesses; 2) Audit records can only provide 
data regarding the access itself, and contains no situational or 
relationship information or knowledge regarding the access. 
3) The process is labour-intensive, without guidance of 
where to look for potential breaches. Subsequently, 
illegitimate accesses are buried amongst the audits of 
appropriate accesses. 
The challenges facing healthcare security are as follows, 
a lack of labelled data from previous attacks; constantly 
evolving attacks and analyst’s limited investigative time and 
budget [12]. Current solutions employ either analyst driven 
solutions, or unsupervised machine learning solutions but 
both of these solutions are insufficient on their own. Analyst 
driven solutions often lead to a high number of false 
negatives, due to their reliance on human judgement, in 
addition to delays between attack detection and the 
implementation of countermeasures [12]. Similarly, 
unsupervised machine learning solutions are insufficient due 
to their high number of false positive alarms, which leads to 
alarm fatigue and distrust by analysts [12]. To address the 
issue of patient privacy in healthcare infrastructures, 
hospitals establish a combination of access control solutions, 
and anomaly detection approaches. 
A. Access Control 
Healthcare systems commonly employ access control 
solutions [13]; where once an individual has been 
authenticated, they are allowed unhindered access inside the 
perimeter [7]. This means that it is a challenge to impose an 
access control policy on employees in a healthcare setting 
due to the dynamic and unpredictable patterns of hospital 
care [5]. Access control based approaches are limited due to 
several factors [6], including: 
 Unpredictable and dynamic care patterns, including 
scheduled and unscheduled inpatient, outpatient and 
emergency department visits 
 Varied workflows, with providers requiring access in 
unexpected areas 
 A mobile workforce, with access required at unexpected 
locations and times 
 The collaborative nature of clinical work and teaching 
environments 
 A large number of users with varied job titles and roles 
 Users job titles not directly relating to a list of patients 
whose records it would be appropriate to access 
Due to these limitations, access control approaches are 
insufficient as the sole method of anomaly prevention within 
EPRs.  
B. Detection Approaches 
The following section examines several related common 
detection approaches to anomaly detection in large datasets: 
The use of statistical and machine learning techniques 
have previously been used to detect fraud in financial 
reporting [14]. They detect fraud in credit card transaction 
data [15], construct spam email detectors [16] and solve 
fraud detection problems [17]. Their success is partly due to 
the fact that machine learning models can be trained on 
historical data access behaviours to identify future abnormal 
patterns [5].  
In supervised anomaly detection approaches, a set of 
labelled training instances are provided, typically in the form 
of anomaly and non-anomaly [18]. The instances are then 
trained using a classification model based on their variable 
features. The resulting models are used to classify new 
actions. A clearly labelled training dataset, however, is too 
resource intensive to generate for EPRs, particularly in the 
context of a dynamic, evolving environment [18]. Supervised 
machine learning models, such as Support Vector Machines 
(SVMs), linear regression and logistic regression have been 
successfully applied to the challenge of detecting illegitimate 
access within EPR systems [5]–[7]. 
In unsupervised anomaly detection approaches, the 
inherent structure, or patterns in a dataset, are utilised in 
order to determine when a particular instance is sufficiently 
different [18]. Unsupervised techniques, such as k-nearest 
neighbour anomaly detection, are designed to measure the 
distances between instances using features such as social 
structures [19].  
Collaborative filtering is a dyadic prediction method, 
where the task is to predict a label for the interaction of a pair 
of entities [5]. Within a hospital setting, these entities would 
be the system user, and the patient record. Collaborative 
filtering approaches for detecting unauthorised access to 
EPR data have been successful in recognising the identity of 
users and patients involved in patient record access [5]. 
Through the use of explicit and latent features for staff and 
patients, the following scenarios can be understood to be 
more likely to be involved in a future violation 1) a patient, 
whose record has previously been involved in a violation, or 
2) a staff member who has performed a violation in the past 
[5]. In addition to the use of latent features of a dataset to 
fingerprint, a user based on historical access data, 
collaborative filtering can collate data for reliable parameter 
estimation and create interaction-specific predictions [5]. 
Genetic algorithms are evolutionary algorithms intended 
to obtain more accurate solutions as time progresses [20]. 
The algorithms encode a potential solution to a problem on a 
chromosome-like data structure, and apply recombination 
and mutation operators to the structures so as to preserve 
critical information and improve the utility/objective 
function [21]. A number of initial solutions are generated 
(which act as ‘parents’). Crossover and mutation operators 
are applied and new solutions are then generated, with the 
stronger solutions remaining and the weaker solutions being 
eliminated [20]. This process continues until the best 
solution has been found. Genetic algorithms have previously 
been applied successfully to the domains of credit card fraud, 
astronomy, optimisation problem and computer science [20]. 
There is therefore potential for the application of genetic 
algorithms to the field of anomalous access behaviour 
detection within healthcare infrastructures. 
C. Existing Approaches 
Monitoring Access Pattern phase 1 (MAP1) demonstrates 
that statistical and machine learning methods can assist in 
identifying potentially illegitimate accesses to EPRs [6]. One 
of the objectives of MAP1 is to identify illegitimate access to 
EPRs and score each access for appropriateness, so the top 
scoring cases can be prioritised and investigated by privacy 
officers. The production of scores indicating suspiciousness 
of access is preferable to simple rules-based patterns. A 
training set is created through labelling selected events as 
either suspicious or appropriate by privacy officers. Logistic 
Regression (LR) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
models is trained on 10-fold cross-validation sets of 1,291 
labelled events [6]. MAP2 (Monitoring Access Pattern phase 
2) is an extension of the work of MAP1 and relates to fine-
tuning the detection algorithm [7]. MAP2 focuses on the 
construction of classifiers with appropriate filtering 
techniques to detect rare events. MAP2 uses a combination 
of Signature detection, Anomaly detection and Classifier 
detection, extending the capabilities of the previous MAP1 
classifier algorithm. Privacy officers identified 78 
illegitimate accesses to the EPR during the study period, and 
MAP2 identified 75 of those accesses independently, 
demonstrating that the technique has the capability to 
facilitate the detection of rare, but important events [7].  
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
systems are distributed systems, which collect and process 
logs generated by both network hardware and software 
assets, and perform real-time and centralised event analysis 
[22]. In doing so, event correlation mechanisms are 
implemented by the analysis server to identify the occurrence 
of malicious actions and foresee an attack. However there are 
a number of issues present in current SIEM solutions. 
Specifically, current SIEM solutions have processing 
constraints which limit the effectiveness of discovering 
violations within the business logic. Additionally, SIEMs 
cannot process data at the edge of the deployed architecture. 
This presents limits in addressing data disclosure and privacy 
issues, a particularly relevant problem within large scale 
deployments. Finally, no mechanisms are provided to 
improve the dependability of data storage systems that 
contain evidence of security breaches and maintain and store 
the sensitive data of involved parties [22].  
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
As the background demonstrates, there is a clear need for 
a cloud-based anomaly detection system to ensure patient 
confidentiality within EPR systems. Our research to date has 
focused on the development of a system for modelling data 
flow within healthcare infrastructures [23][24]. The system 
assists information security officers, within healthcare 
organisations, to improve the situational awareness of patient 
data confidentiality risks. The issues of scalability require the 
system to be deployed on a cloud domain due to the 
requirements of storage of the EPR audit data and the 
processing of the machine learning algorithms.  
A. Approach 
The process follows the methodology order presented in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Methodology of the Proposed Process 
The system put forward in this paper processes EPR audit 
data and presents it in such a way as to identify and highlight 
patterns and potentially anomalous behaviours within it. The 
data analysis element (components 2-6) is deployed in the 
cloud. 
B. Process Components 
The system components presented in Figure 1, are 
explained in this section.  
1. EPR Audit Data: This audit data is stored by the EPR 
and captures every interaction with the EPR.  
2. Feature Extraction: Features of the EPR audit data are 
extracted for machine learning purposes. Additionally 
during the testing phase, the data is split into training, 
test, and validation datasets. 
3. Unsupervised Learning: Unsupervised machine learning 
techniques such as k-means clustering are applied in 
order to extract unpredictable patterns and anomalies 
from the data. 
4. Supervised Learning: Supervised machine learning 
techniques such as k Nearest Neighbour and Logistic 
Regression are applied in order to extract knowledge 
from the data. 
5. Data Storage: This component stores the data in a 
database when not in use by the other components. 
Additionally, datasets of known attack vectors are 
stored. 
6. Data Processing, Ranking and Selection: After the data 
has been pre-processed and subsequently analysed by 
the machine learning algorithms, the data is ranked and 
selected based on previous user interaction. This is to 
ensure the most notable data points are presented to the 
user first. 
7. Visualisation: This component generates the 
visualisation for the user. The component uses the 
system operators input and calls upon the data stored in 
the database component, which is then processed and 
visualised within the generation engine and passed onto 
the UI Output. 
8. Data Analyst: The operator interacts with and 
manipulates the visualisation in order to set their own 
data parameters. This increases their situational 
awareness of the data flow within the healthcare 
infrastructure. 
IV. EVALUATION 
In this section, a case study of the EPR audit data is 
presented. This rich dataset contains 1,007,727 rows of audit 
logs of every user and their EPR activity in a UK hospital 
over a period of 18 months (28-02-16 – 21-08-17). Each 
User UID is tokenised through isolating the unique entries 
within the dataset, and assigning each value a unique random 
number between 1,000,0000 and 9,999,999. This process is 
done to ensure that once anonymised, each random identifier 
is still correlated accurately to the original User UID. The 
range selected is chosen due to information governance 
concerns regarding viewing the data un-tokenised. 
Therefore, the tokenizer script is written with the 
understanding that there are over 1,000,000 rows of audit 
logs, and therefore the potential for over 1,000,000 unique 
values. There are 1,515 unique User UIDs and 72,878 unique 
Patient UIDs. The same process is completed for the Patient 
UID field. 
The dataset consists of the following fields: 
 Date - The date the patient record is accessed 
 Time - The time the patient record is accessed 
 Device - The name of the device the user accessed the 
patient record 
 User UID (Tokenised) - A tokenised representation of 
the User who accessed the patient record 
 Routine - The routine performed whilst accessing the 
patient record (is the record updated, is a letter printed, 
etc.) 
 Patient UID (Tokenised) - A tokenised representation of 
the patient record that is accessed 
 Duration - The number of seconds the user accessed the 
patient record (this number counts for as long as the 
record is on the screen, so may not always be an 
accurate reflection of how long the User is actively 
interacting with the data) 
 Latest Adm Date - The date the patient is last admitted 
to the hospital 
 Latest Dis Date - The date the patient is last discharged 
from the hospital 
A snapshot of the first 10 rows in the dataset is presented 
in Table 1: 
Table 1 - EPR AUDIT SAMPLE DATA 
Date Time Device User UID Routine Patient UIDDurationLocationLatest Adm DateLatest Dis
28-02-16 00:00 4Q7QF3J.1 U6199811 PHA.ORDSP8290382 54 28-02-16 29-02-16
28-02-16 00:02 27ZKF5J.1 U5053689 ASF P1591062 13 22-07-08 22-07-08
28-02-16 00:02 C0VLJ5J.2 U2151170 REC REC:(DRP) UK.OEP3126528 77 15-02-16 15-02-16
28-02-16 00:02 27ZKF5J.1 U5053689 ASF P1591062 54 22-07-08 22-07-08
28-02-16 00:04 C0VLJ5J.2 U2151170 REC UK.OEP8672400 147 08-02-16 08-02-16
28-02-16 00:04 BEDSIDE_09.1U9786800 PHA.ORDSP7076283 22 23-01-02 23-01-02
28-02-16 00:04 27ZKF5J.1 U5053689 ASF VH P2718689 39 28-09-04 28-09-04
28-02-16 00:06 C0VLJ5J.2 U2151170 REC REC:(DRP) UK.OEP8526192 165 08-01-16 08-01-16
28-02-16 00:08 9P7QF3J.3 U4425924 NOTE P5032341 75 25-01-12 25-01-12
28-02-16 00:10 7ZTLJ5J.1 U8857044 PHA.ORDSP8705655 42 04-03-07 05-03-07  
In Figure 2, a heatmap is presented of the dataset 
comparing Patient UID to the duration of the patient record 
access. The graph shows that there is consistent point density 
of up to 25,487 in the first row of the matrix, indicating that 
most patient records are only accessed for fewer than 300 
seconds (5 minutes). This would represent normal and 
typical behaviour within the hospital. 
 
Figure 2 - Heatmap - Patient UID and Duration 
Additionally, unsupervised machine learning techniques 
will be implemented to classify this data in future work as 
there is limited abnormal data and a lack of labelled training 
data. Representing the data as a heatmap does highlight some 
clear anomalies in the data. Notably, certain users are 
identified spending over 18,000 seconds (over 5 hours) 
accessing patient records. Extracting features from this data 
(such as mean, median, mode and range of duration), will be 
used to train classifiers to autonomously learn normal and 
abnormal patterns through supervised learning techniques. 
This process will occur once the data has been clustered 
through the use of unsupervised learning algorithms. In 
combing both unsupervised and supervised machine learning 
techniques, the system will aid privacy officers in their 
situational awareness of access to patient records and 
identify outliers for investigation.  
 
Figure 3 - Scattergraph displaying relationship between Patient 
UID and User UID 
In Figure 3, a scatter graph displays the relationship 
between Patient UID and User UID. The User UID is 
displayed on the x-axis whilst the Patient UID is displayed 
on the y-axis. The graph is a high level representation of 
when users are accessing patient’s details within the full 
dataset. The graph demonstrates the complexity of the data, 
as there is no clear structure to the data at face value. The 
data therefore needs to have meaningful features selected and 
users of interest identified. In doing so, legitimate accesses 
can be removed from the visualisation and illegitimate 
accesses highlighted to a privacy officer. 
 
Figure 4 - Profile of 10 Users - Scattergraph of User UID and 
Patient UID 
In Figure 4 a profile of 10 Users is presented as a case 
study. A scatter graph displaying the relationship between 
User UID and Patient UID is displayed. The 10 users are a 
random selection of users, as visualising 10 users represents 
a reflection of the dataset as a whole. Figure 4 is a 
representation of the potential of the system to filter the 
larger dataset of Figure 3  to users of interest. The selected 
users are the first 10 in the dataset (having been assigned a 
random number through the tokenisation process). User A is 
in the upper quartile of accesses to patient records, whereas 
user B accesses far fewer patients in comparison, indicating a 
different job role. Staff members C and D have a similar 
number of patients accessed and therefore likely share a 
similar job role within the hospital. In this way, roles can be 
clustered within the data and features extracted. Unusual or 
erratic spikes in activity would indicate illegitimate activity 
that would warrant further investigation. 
This paper demonstrates the complexity and density of 
EPR audit data and the capability for a cloud-based anomaly 
detection system to enhance patient privacy and 
confidentiality. The system presented in this paper proposes 
a data analysis and visualisation approach, deployed on a 
cloud platform, to explore and describe the data in order to 
aid the situational awareness of privacy officers within 
healthcare infrastructures. Initial experiments have used a 
real-world dataset containing 1,007,727 audit records. The 
system aids privacy officers to find the ‘needle in a haystack’ 
of potential patient privacy violations within their vast data 
infrastructure. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The results in Section IV display preliminary 
explorations of the dataset and the potential insights that a 
cloud-based detection system would provide. The results 
demonstrate the complexity and density of investigating EPR 
audit data for anomaly detection. Feature extraction and 
selection will be used for the benefit of machine learning 
models. These models are then used to explore the data 
further, with a particular emphasis on unsupervised learning, 
such as clustering. Once unsupervised algorithms have been 
selected, the system will be deployed in the cloud to process 
transactions and generate anomalies for investigation. This 
will allow initial patterns within the data to be identified to 
understand the data and identify illegitimate access to patient 
records within this real world EPR dataset. Following this 
process, these data points will be labelled as anomaly and 
non-anomaly and trained using a supervised learning model. 
Additionally, future work will reassign the random values of 
the User UID and Patient UID to a sequential number 
sequence for ease of use and visualisation. 
Future work will focus on investigating unsupervised 
machine learning algorithms for clustering the data and 
identifying outliers within it. Additionally, the cloud 
infrastructure platform for the system will be explored 
further to understand the benefits it can provide to an 
anomaly detection system on real world EPR audit data. 
Once the system has been refined the system will be 
automated and tested on real-world data in a UK hospital to 
detect potential anomalies in real-time. Feedback from 
analysts during this testing period will inform supervised 
machine learning algorithms to pick up on patterns and 
trends within the data and tailor the system to the unique 
threat landscape of the healthcare infrastructure. 
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